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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Messrs. [redacted] 25X1A DATE: 21 January 1952

FROM : [redacted] 25X1A

SUBJECT: Comments on draft NIEs-50, 53, and 57.

1. While recognizing that it is rather late in the day to raise questions, we do feel impelled to repeat our reservations about the above drafts. Essentially, we question whether they (and NIE-53 in particular) give sufficient weight to the importance, scope, and potential of the Soviet-sponsored unity campaign. This tactic is obviously the chief Soviet cold war weapon vis-a-vis Germany and should, we feel, be explicitly mentioned in NIE-53's conclusions and text.

2. We are in full agreement with the basic premise that the USSR will not give up ultimate control over East Germany. We feel, however, that the reasons therefor should be more fully stated, both in NIE-50 and especially in NIE-53. For example, shouldn't we stress that the evidence that the USSR is digging in militarily and economically in East Germany in itself strongly indicates that the USSR doesn't plan to get out.

3. While accepting the above basic premise, we feel that NIE-53 in particular gives insufficient scope to what the Soviets might hope to obtain through further exploitation of the unity campaign. NIE-57 concludes (and in our opinion, rightly) that the unity issue will be insufficient to block West German integration; this does not mean, however, that the Kremlin necessarily accepts this too. Moreover, even if the Kremlin can't block integration, it may be able substantially to delay it through various moves. We may be examining this question too much in black-and-white terms of prevention rather than in terms of delay. And even a West Germany already integrated with the West will still be susceptible to unity pressures from the East.

4. If the USSR considers the German problem as crucial (as we believe to be the case), it will increasingly intensify and perhaps even become desperate in its counterpressures as Bonn moves ever closer to the West (this time factor, too, might be mentioned in NIE-53). We agree that the USSR will not go to war over this development or even give up the GDR to stop it, but might the Kremlin not go to somewhat greater lengths in plugging "unity" than is apparently envisioned in our present drafts? We think that the USSR may have (and may use) considerably more room for maneuver without compromising ultimate control over East Germany, than is at present implied.

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5. Therefore we do not feel that NIE-50 and 53 can conclude quite so firmly that the USSR will not impair in any substantial way its hold over East Germany in order to thwart Western integration plans. In Austria (though the parallel is inexact) the USSR retains control over the Sovzone, even though the Austrian Government functions there. We would prefer a more flexible approach which at least examines the possibilities that the USSR, as time runs out, might go considerably further than it has so far in giving at least the color of substance to its unity campaign. Since the crux of the present phase of the unity campaign is the issue of all-German elections, this question should be treated in NIE-50 and 53. We believe, for example, that Soviet acceptance of the West German conditions for such elections or at least an effort to negotiate on these conditions must be regarded as a possibility. It may be possible for the USSR to evolve some election formula which will not seriously compromise its ultimate control over the Sovzone.

6. We very tentatively suggest that the three German drafts might be revised somewhat along the following lines. These are not fully phrased revisions and do not cover all the above comments but will indicate the trend of our thoughts.

a. Recommended change in NIE-57. Page 10, paragraph 18. Omit sentences 2-4 and substitute the following: "Only proposals meeting the conditions laid down by the West Germans for all-German elections, including the provision that the elections be subject to international supervision, would remove the objections of the West Germans. We believe that the Kremlin will seriously consider meeting these West German terms for integration in the belief that by this means they could block the integration of West Germany with the West. On balance, however, we believe the Kremlin is unlikely either to agree to these conditions or to advance any other formulae which would prove acceptable to the West Germans. It is therefore unlikely that the unification issue will effectively block integration.

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b. Recommended change in NIE-53 draft dated 11 Jan 52, page 6, new paragraph 10. Omit this paragraph and substitute the following: "We do not believe that the Kremlin will under any circumstances surrender its essential controls in East Germany. In order to prevent West German integration with the West and West German rearmament the Kremlin might, however, seriously consider giving up some of its political controls. On balance we doubt that a formula is likely to be found which will be acceptable to both the USSR and the West Germans. The East Germans have already rejected the West German conditions for all-German elections, and we believe that the USSR is uhlikely to permit the East Germans to reverse this decision. Internationally supervised free elections would not entail a loss of Soviet military control which

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rests on Soviet military occupation; they would, however, sharply reduce or even eliminate entirely existing Communist political controls in East Germany. We do not believe that this loss of political control would be compensated for by political pressures exerted through continued Soviet military occupation of East Germany or through covert Communist mechanisms. Such elections would almost certainly result in a weakening of existing Soviet economic controls and thus in reduced levels of deliveries from East Germany to the USSR. This prospect would clearly outweigh the possible advantage that, through a politically unified Germany, the Soviet bloc could gain easier access to the industrial output of West Germany.

c. Recommended change in NIE-50 draft dated 17 Jan. 52, page 1, paragraph 2 and draft dated 14 Jan. 52, page 27, paragraph 42. Omit these paragraphs. Substitute something along lines of paragraph recommended in par. 3 of this memorandum.

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